Pain magnitude and pain tolerance for arm immersion in ice water were assessed during a baseline and posttest session. Before the posttest half the subjects received (and half did not receive) an analgesia suggestion. On the basis of their written testimony, subjects were classified as having either predominantly coped (e.g., imagined events inconsistent with pain; made positive self-statements) or predominantly exaggerated (e.g., worried about and exaggerated the noxious aspects of the situation) during each immersion. On both immersions copers reported less pain and exhibited higher pain tolerance than exaggerators. Moreover, the suggestion was associated with reductions in reported pain only when it transformed baseline exaggerators into posttest copers. Theoretical implications are discussed.
events during noxious stimulation). However, these studies have also shown wide individual differences in reported pain both among subjects given coping instructions and among uninstructed controls. Such differences may be related to differences in cognitive activities occurring during noxious stimulation (Meichenbaum, 1977; Spanos et al., 1979; Spanos, Stam, & Brazil, in press ). Spanos et al. (1979) interviewed subjects immediately after painful stimulation about what their cognitions had been during such stimulation (i.e., arm immersion in ice water for 60 sec). All subjects underwent both a baseline and a posttest immersion. Those given a suggestion for pain reduction before the posttest were more likely than controls to engage in coping cognitions during the posttest. Moreover, subjects given the suggestion showed a significant decrement in reported pain on the posttest whereas controls did not. Some subjects given the suggestion failed to engage in coping cognitions whereas some control subjects spontaneously devised strategies of their own. Furthermore, some of the subjects in both suggestion and control treatments exaggerated the noxious aspects of the situation. These subjects will be referred to as "exaggerators," or "catastrophizers." Regardless of their treatment group, the only subjects who reported significant baseline-to-posttest pain decrements were nonexaggerators who used coping strat-egies. These data support the hypothesis that high levels of within-treatment variability in reported pain are related to variability in subjects' cognitive activity. Spanos et al. (1979) did not determine what subjects were thinking about during baseline testing. However, the finding that some control subjects spontaneously engaged in coping strategies whereas others exaggerated during posttesting suggests that similar variations in cognitive activity might also have occurred during baseline testing. This possibility raises a number of important issues concerning interactions among cognitions during baseline, suggestions for pain reduction, and posttest responding. For instance, do subjects who engaged in coping cognitions during baseline testing report less pain at this time than those who exaggerated? Do suggestions for pain reduction lead to posttest decrements in reported pain if subjects were already engaged in coping cognitions during baseline testing? Do suggestions reduce pain by transforming exaggerators into nonexaggerating copers? The present study was designed to assess issues of this type.
Method
Pain magnitude and pain tolerance measures were obtained for subjects who immersed an arm in ice water during both a baseline and a posttest session. Before the posttest immersion half the subjects were administered an analgesia suggestion asking them to imagine their arms as being numb and insensitive. The remaining half served as controls and underwent the posttest immersion without an intervening suggestion. All subjects were interviewed about their experiences immediately after the baseline immersion and once again after the posttest immersion. For each immersion subjects were classified in terms of their coping and exaggerating ideation. Thus, we were able to assess (a) the relationship between cognitions (coping/exaggerating) within sessions, (b) changes in cognitions and pain ratings between sessions, and (c) the effects of suggestion on both cognition and pain reports.
Subjects
A total of 22 female and 16 male Carleton University undergraduates (ages 17-40) volunteered to participate for pay and course credit in a study on "cognitive activity and pain perception." Subjects were informed that they would be asked to immerse their arms in ice water on two occasions, and that the immersions would probably be painful.
Procedure
All subjects were individually tested in two sessions: a baseline session followed within a week by a posttest experimental session.
Baseline immersion. On entering the experimental room, each subject was seated between two plastic tanks measuring 25,4 cm X 35.6 cm and 38.1 cm deep, which contained the ice and water used as the "cold pressor" pain stimulus. A wire-mesh screen divided the tank into one section containing crushed ice and another containing ice-free water. The water was maintained at 0 to 2°C and was circulated during each immersion.
Before their baseline immersion subjects were shown a category scale taken from Spanos et al. (1979) that ranged from 0 (no pain) to 10 (excruciating pain). Subjects were informed that, when their arms were in the water, they were to call out numbers from this scale that corresponded to their level of pain whenever the experimenter said "report." Subjects were given a single practice trial by immersing their arms (right and left arms were counterbalanced) for 10 sec. At the end of this period the experimenter said "report" and removed their arms from the water.
Next, subjects were informed that they would shortly immerse their opposite arms in the water and would periodically be asked to report their level of pain. They were then told that it was important that they keep their arms in the water for at least 1 min., that they would be informed when a minute was up, and that they should keep their arms in the water for as long after 1 min. as they could. However, they were also told that if their arms became so uncomfortable that they did not wish to continue, they could withdraw it at any point. Immersion was terminated by the experimenter after 5 min. for subjects who had not yet withdrawn their arms.
Immediately following these instructions the female experimenter (JMB or DH) immersed subjects' hands and forearms, said "report" every 30 sec following the immersion, and recorded subjects' responses. She also informed subjects when their arms had been immersed for 1 min. The duration of the immersion (in seconds) was also recorded.
After removing their arms from the water, all subjects wrote answers to five open-ended questions about their experiences during immersion. The questions were modified from those employed by Spanos et al. (1979) and Brown (1978) and were concerned with what subjects thought about, imagined, felt, and said to themselves during the immersion.
Posttest immersion. During this session subjects were refamiliarized with the category rating-scale, given another 10-sec practice immersion, and readministered the tolerance instructions. However, before the posttest immersion half of the subjects, chosen at random (with the restriction that 12 females and 8 males be included in each cell of the design), were administered a 45-sec tape-recorded analgesia suggestion modified slightly from Spanos, Barber, & Lang (1974) . The suggestion instructed the subjects to think of the arm to be immersed as being numb and insensitive and to imagine it as a piece of rubber. Immediately following the suggestion subjects' arms were immersed and their category ratings were recorded every 30 sec in the manner described above. The remaining half of the subjects (con-trols) received the same sequence but without the analgesia suggestion.
Following the immersion subjects wrote answers to the five open-ended questions concerning immersion experiences that had been given in the baseline session.
Postimmersion testimony. Two judges who were blind to subjects' treatment group and pain scores classified their postimmersion written testimony into four mutually exclusive categories. The categories, which reflected subjects' predominant cognitive activity during an immersion, were (a) predominantly engaged in coping cognitions, (b) predominantly engaged in exaggerating cognitions (i.e., catastrophizing), (c) coped and exaggerated about equally, and (d) neither coped nor exaggerated. Each subject was classified twice: once with respect to the baseline immersion and again with respect to the posttest. Judges agreed 86% of the time in classifying subjects' baseline cognitions and 88% of the time for their posttest cognitions. Discrepancies were resolved through discussion. The criteria for classifying subjects were those employed by Brown (1978) and by Spanos et al. (1979) . Briefly, subjects were classified as copers if their testimony indicated that, during the immersion, they were predominantly involved in ignoring the pain and/or imagining events unrelated to or inconsistent with the pain. They were labeled exaggerators if they were predominantly involved in focusing on and exaggerating the unpleasantness of the situation and/or thinking about and imagining other painful situations.
Results

Suggestion Effects
Pain magnitude. All subjects made at least two pain ratings per immersion (one at 30 sec and the other at 60 sec). Only pain magnitude ratings given at these two intervals were analyzed.
The effects of the analgesia suggestion on subjects' pain ratings between the baseline and posttest immersions were assessed by means of a 2 (Sex) X 2 (Suggestion/No Suggestion) X 2 (Baseline/Posttest) X 2 (30/60 sec pain reports) split-plot ANOVA with sex and suggestion/no suggestion as between-subject variables and the remaining two factors as within-subject variables. An unweighted-means solution was used for the unequal number of males and females. No significant effects were found for sex. The Suggestion/No Suggestion X Baseline/ Posttest interaction was significant F(l, 34) = 7.48, p < .01. Control (no suggestion) subjects did not show a significant change in pain ratings from baseline to posttest. Subjects given the suggestion before the posttest showed a significant decrement in reported pain. The means involved in this interaction are shown in Table I. 1 Pain tolerance. A 2 X 2 split-plot ANOVA with one between-subjects variable (suggestion/no suggestion) and one within-subjects variable (baseline/posttest) was conducted on the number of seconds subjects kept their arms in the ice water (tolerance). Tolerance was significantly higher on the posttest, M = 209.13 sec, than on the baseline, M = 165.63 sec, F(\, 36) = 10.92, p < .01. The effects for the suggestion/no suggestion variable and for the interaction were not significant. Unfortunately, interpretation of the nonsignificant interaction is complicated by ceiling effects. Subjects were not allowed to immerse their arms beyond 300 sec. During the posttest 9 of the 19 suggestion subjects (47%) and 8 of the controls (42%) reached the 300-sec limit. As a result the effects of suggestion on tolerance remain unclear. Table 2 shows the number of subjects classified as copers and exaggerators on the baseline, and also the number so classified on the posttest. On the baseline three subjects were classified as indeterminates and two were classified as using no strategy. On the posttest four were classified as indeterminates and two were classified as using no ' In this, and in all subsequent analyses that included it as a factor, the 30/60 sec variable attained statistical significance but failed to interact with any other variable. In all cases subjects reported more pain at 60 sec than at 30 sec. The specific results for this variable in each analysis are not included simply to avoid redundancy. They may be obtained from the senior author on request.
Predominant Strategy
strategy. Indeterminates and no-strategy subjects were dropped from all analyses that assessed the effects of predominant strategy.
Baseline testing. A 2 (Copers/Exaggerators) X 2 (30/60 sec) ANOVA (unweightedmeans solution for unequal «s) was carried out on baseline pain ratings. Copers reported significantly less pain than exaggerators, F(l, 31) = 6.12, p < .05, and there was no significant interaction (see Table 2 ). As shown in Table 2 , copers also had significantly higher baseline tolerance scores than exaggerators <(31) = 3.22, p < .01.
Posttesting. A Copers/Exaggerators X 30/60 sec ANOVA indicated that copers reported less posttest pain than exaggerators, F(l, 29) = 4.37, p < .05. Copers also had significantly higher posttest tolerance scores than exaggerators, t(29) = 2.09, p < .05. The relevant means are shown in Table 2 . Table 3 presents the mean pain magnitude and pain-tolerance scores for subjects classified as copers on both the baseline and posttest, for those classified as exaggerators on both immersions, and for those who exaggerated on the baseline but coped on the posttest.
Changes in Strategy
Copers-copers. A 2 (Suggestion/No Suggestion) X 2 (Baseline/Posttest) X 2 Note, ns = number of subjects per cell. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Mean category pain-ratings are averaged accross the 30/60 sec reporting intervals. (30/60 sec) split-plot ANOVA was conducted on the pain ratings of subjects who coped on both immersions. None of the effects involving the suggestion or baseline/posttest variables were significant. A 2 (Suggestion/ No Suggestion) X 2 (Baseline/Posttest) splitplot ANOVA on pain-tolerance scores also yielded nonsignificant results. In other words, the analgesia suggestion did not reduce reported pain or increase pain tolerance from baseline to posttest in subjects who already coped before being given, the suggestion.
Exaggerators-exaggerators. Only four subjects exaggerated at both baseline and posttest assessments. A 2 (Baseline/Posttest) X 2 (30/60 sec) within-subjects ANOVA revealed no significant baseline to posttest differences in pain ratings for these subjects. Similarly, t tests indicated no significant baseline to posttest tolerance differences. Thus, subjects who exaggerated on both immersions reported equivalent degrees of pain on both immersions.
Exaggerators-copers. A Baseline/Posttest X 30/60 sec within-subjects ANOVA was conducted on the pain ratings of subjects who exaggerated on the baseline but then coped on the posttest. These subjects rated their pain as significantly more intense on the baseline than on the posttest, F(l, 6) = 12.80, p < .05. They also showed lower pain tolerance while exaggerating on the baseline than while coping on the posttest, /(6) = 2.46, p < .05.
Discussion
Our results replicate the numerous studies (cited in the introduction) that have reported reductions in category ratings of pain intensity following suggestion. They also replicate and extend Spanos et al.'s (1979) findings that suggestions enhance subjects' use of coping strategies and that subjects who engage in extensive coping without exaggerating report less pain than those who exaggerate. Of particular importance was our finding that the analgesia suggestion was effective in reducing reported pain only to the extent that it transformed baseline exaggerators into posttest copers. Subjects who exaggerated in spite of the suggestion did not report pain reductions. Moreover, those who were already coping before being given the suggestion (i.e., during baseline) also reported no pain reductions.
Our findings also speak to the issue of the wide individual differences in baseline responding commonly found in pain studies. Such differences are clearly related to variations in cognitive activity. Subjects who become fearful and exaggerate the noxious quality of the pain situation give higher pain ratings and show lower pain tolerance than those who remain calm and engage in cognitive activity aimed at coping with the noxious situation.
A number of studies (Barber & Hahn, 1962; Evans & Paul, 1970; Spanos et al., 1974; Stam & Spanos, 1980) now indicate that a hypnotic induction procedure coupled with an analgesia suggestion is no more effective in reducing reported pain than the suggestion alone. On the other hand, suggested analgesia does appear to be moderated by subjects' pretested levels of hypnotic susceptibility. Hypnotic and nonhypnotic subjects who obtain high scores on tests of susceptibility (high susceptibles) show greater suggestion-induced reductions in reported pain than corresponding low susceptibles (Evans & Paul, 1970; Spanos et al., 1979) . Hypnotic susceptibility is correlated with a proclivity for becoming absorbed in imaginative pursuits (Spanos & McPeake, 1975; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974) , and analgesia suggestions usually encourage subjects to imagine events inconsistent with experiencing pain (e.g., imagine your arm is numb). Perhaps subjects who exaggerate on the pretest but cope following suggestions tend to be high susceptibles who possess the imaginative abilities required to respond as instructed. On the other hand, many low susceptibles who exaggerate on the pretest may have difficulty becoming absorbed in suggested imaginings. Being unable to cope as instructed, these subjects may continue exaggerating when reexposed to the noxious stimulation. These hypotheses could be tested in a study that stratified subjects in terms of susceptibility and then assessed their cognitive strategies and reported pain both before and after analgesia suggestion.
There are at least three ways to interpret suggestion-induced reductions in reported pain. The first suggests that cognitions effect changes in the representation of the painful stimulus; the second argues that subjects are simply faking; and the third sugggests that reports of reduced pain are the outcome of an attribution process.
Suggestions and Sensitivity to Noxious Stimulation
This notion holds that analgesia suggestions and coping strategies lower sensitivity to painful stimulation or, to put it more precisely, lead to lower scale values of the painful stimuli whereas exaggerating increases scale values. Unfortunately, almost all studies in this area have used category ratingprocedures to measure pain magnitude. These measures are subject to a number of systematic biases (e.g., Poulton, 1979 ) that preclude their straightforward acceptance as indexes of perceptual sensitivity. Studies employing alternative scaling-procedures have found that analgesia suggestions (even in high-susceptible subjects) are not related to reduced painfulness as assessed by signal-detection procedures (Clark & Goodman, 1974) , functional measurement procedure (Jones, Spanos, & Anuza, Note 2), or magnitude estimation procedures (Spanos, Jones, Brown, & Homer, Note 3; Stam, Petrusic, & Spanos, in press) . In short there is currently little evidence for the hypothesis that suggested analgesia results in a qualitative reduction in scale values of the noxious stimuli.
Faking
Analgesia suggestions contain strong demands that subjects report reduced pain. Perhaps subjects respond to these suggestions by simply faking reduced pain, by publicly reporting lower levels of pain while privately acknowledging higher levels. When seriously considered this seemingly straightforward hypothesis runs into a number of difficulties. For example, the demands inherent in analgesia suggestions typically call for the elimination (rather than merely the reduction) of pain. Nevertheless very few subjects report pain elimination following suggestion. Thus a faking hypothesis (like any other) must account for the wide individual differences that occur in response to suggestion. If the contention is that subjects fake to different degrees, then an account for differential faking in response to consistent demands must be proffered. In the present study it seems rather farfetched to use faking to account for baseline differences in reported pain between copers and exaggerators, and equally difficult to explain why suggestion should induce faked pain-reductions in baseline exaggerators but not in baseline copers. Other complexities also arise. Why are suggested analgesia effects dependent on the scaling procedures used to assess painfulness? Reduced painfulness is easy to fake under both magnitude estimation and category rating-procedures. Nevertheless, these two procedures yield different results even when both are employed with the same subjects (Stam et al., 1981) .
Perhaps a faking hypothesis that accounts systematically for these and the many other problems associated with suggested analgesia can be developed. As far as we know, however, such an account is not available.
Reduced Pain and Attribution
Perhaps analgesia suggestions and cognitive variables effect the manner in which subjects interpret their sensory experiences, when sensitivity to the sensory aspects of pain remains unchanged (Spanos, in press ). This hypothesis does not imply that subjects are lying when they report pain reductions following suggestion. Instead, it indicates that the intensity of sensory events may remain unchanged whereas the manner in which these events are defined by the individual has changed. This hypothesis may be outlined in the present case as follows.
The experiences that subjects were asked to rate were, in fact, rather ambiguous. They consisted of a complex of diverse and changing sensations (e.g., cold, prickliness, ache, numbness) that subjects were forced to classify periodically with a restricted range of numbers. Changes in rated painfulness following suggestions might, in part, have reflected attentional shifts to different facets of the sensory complex. For example, changes in the relative weightings given to "cold" and "ache" sensations before and after suggestion might have been one factor leading subjects to conclude that the water was cold "but doesn't really hurt as much as before" (Leventhal & Everhart, 1979; Spanos, in press ). Because of the ambiguities involved in rating their multifaceted experiences, subjects might have employed nonsensory (as well as sensory) information to make their judgments. Among the most important sources of nonsensory information available to them were expectancies of pain reduction created by the suggestion and selfobservation of reacting to the noxious stimulation by either coping or exaggerating. Thus subjects' ratings of pain intensity might have involved an attribution process (Bern, 1970) . Because their sensory experiences were not readily classifiable in terms of the category scale-units, subjects might have inferred their level of pain by observing their own response to the noxious situation. Those who observed themselves behaving in a man-ner inconsistent with high levels of pain (e.g., remaining calm, engaging in coping cognitions) inferred that they were feeling relatively little pain. Those who observed themselves exaggerating inferred relatively high levels of pain, and those who observed themselves exaggerating on the pretest but coping after the suggestion inferred that their posttest pain was reduced by the suggestion (Spanos, in press ).
This attribution hypothesis further suggests that inferences concerning pain level both influenced and, in turn, were influenced by degree of pain tolerance. Subjects who inferred relatively low levels of pain by observing their own coping activities behaved in a manner consistent with these inferences by immersing their arms for relatively long durations. Conversely, subjects' observations of the time interval beyond the designated 1-min. period that they kept their arms in the water might have reinforced their inferences concerning the degree of pain experienced. Data reported by Handler, Madaras, and Bern (1968) are consistent with this hypothesis. In that study subjects subtly induced to tolerate electric shocks rated the shocks as less intense than subjects induced to escape the same shocks. Thus, subjects' observations concerning whether they tolerated or escaped from shock influenced the pain ratings assigned to the shocks.
Other studies that used category scalingprocedures also suggest the occurrence of an attribution process in ratings of painfulness (Lanzetta, Cartwright-Smith, & Kleck, 1976; Nisbett & Schachter, 1966) . For instance, Lanzetta et al. (1976) induced subjects to display behavioral expressions of either suffering (e.g., wincing) or calmness during electric shock. Although exposed to the same shock level, those who displayed suffering reported greater pain than those who displayed calmness. Along related lines Nisbett and Schachter (1966) gave subjects a placebo followed by a series of mild electric shocks. Subjects who were induced to attribute signs of autonomic arousal (e.g., flushing, increased heart rate) to the placebo reported less pain than those who attributed their arousal to the effects of the shock. In short, category ratings of pain may be determined at least in part by attributions based on subjects' observation of their own behavior as well as on the magnitude of the sensory effects produced by the noxious stimulation.
Of course, the reduced sensitivity and attribution hypotheses of suggestion-induced pain reduction are not mutually exclusive. Both processes may occur, albeit to different degrees in different pain-reducing contexts. Future studies that examine the effects of suggestion on measures of sensitivity that are relatively uncontaminated by attributional processes may shed further light on these issues.
